DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 170 814 CS 502 519

AUTHOR Rosenfeld, Richard
TITLE On Critiquing the Critique: Another Look at the Debate over Mass Society and Popular Culture.
PUB DATE May 79
NOTE 35p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Communication Association (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 5-7, 1979)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Broadcast Industry; Communication (Thought Transfer); *Culture; *Information Dissemination; *Mass Media; *Popular Culture; Social Change; *Social Influences; *Sociocultural Patterns

ABSTRACT

The mass culture critique of advanced industrialized society calls forth such images as an omnipresent media; demagogic politics; a bleak, standardized aesthetic landscape; routinized work; and empty leisure; but the mass culture critique suffers from conceptual ambiguity and a paucity of research. The mass culture critique, from both radical and conservative perspectives, encompasses the arguments that mass culture creation has a negative character, and that it negatively affects high culture, its audience, and society at large. Research shows the empirical assumptions of the critique (the structural distinction between mass and high culture and the impact of mass culture on high culture, on its audiences, and on the larger social structure) to be largely unfounded. It is recommended that the terms "mass culture" and "mass society" be dropped and that popular and high cultures be decomposed into their constituent taste cultures. Also, the heavy reliance on content analysis to inform the mass culture critique should be discontinued. It is not sufficient to study content alone to gauge the impact of cultural content on audience; audiences must be studied as well. (DF)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

ED170814

On Critiquing the Critique: Another Look at the Debate over Mass Society and Popular Culture

Richard Rosenfeld
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Richard Rosenfeld

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

1978

AS 502 519

One of the most compelling and at the same time confusing models of advanced industrial society is the mass. While the mass calls forth such clear and striking images an an omnipresent media, demagogic political appeals, a bleak, standardized aesthetic landscape, routinized work and an empty leisure, conceptual ambiguity marks the critique of mass society and mass culture. While there appears to be an abundance of evidence ready at hand to test it, the model is not based upon careful empirical investigation. That conceptual ambiguity and a paucity of research should coincide is not surprising: it is difficult to locate empirical indicators for concepts whose meanings have not been precisely specified. Nevertheless, there exists a body of evidence which is relevant to the debate over mass society and mass culture. Additionally, excellent attempts at conceptual clarification and the formulation of testable propositions have been made (see, especially, Gans, 1966; 1974; Bauer and Bauer, 1960; Wilensky, 1964:173-81; Freidson, 1953).

The present discussion has five purposes: First, the principal elements of the critique of mass society and mass culture will be summarized, with greater emphasis placed upon the theoretical details and the empirical implications of the latter.[1] Second, some conceptual and empirical problems inherent in the critique will be briefly documented. Third, the central assumptions of the critique will be reformulated in a set of testable propositions. Fourth, the propositions will be examined in terms of available evidence. Finally, future directions for theory and research on the massification thesis will be proposed.

The Critique of Mass Culture

Although it has bloomed during the twentieth century, the mass-culture critique originated with the beginnings of popular literature in the late eighteenth century. One of the first observers to suggest a causal connection between a society's political institutions and the quality of its culture was Tocqueville, writing in 1835 that the "democratic principle" prompted the rapid production and distribution of "many imperfect commodities and the consumer to content himself with these commoditites" (Tocqueville, 1960: 403). The arts in democratic societies, warned Tocqueville, languish in a state of "accomplished mediocrity," such societies being virtually incapable of producing what would later be termed "high" or "serious" art. The best members of democratic societies can hope for are great numbers of "pretty and elegant" works, in contrast with the few superior productions of aristocratic societies (Toqueville, 1960:403-404).

Several of the more important themes of the twentieth century critique of mass culture can be found in Tocqueville's early discussion. Thus the images of the passive consumer and of the mass production of art as well as other commodities remain powerful weapons in the arsenal of contemporary critics. However, perhaps the greatest source of inspiration, as well as confusion, for later critics is the linkage fashioned by Tocqueville between a

society's political structure and the nature and quality of its culture, particularly its art. In that equation lie the sociological dimensions to the debate over mass culture. In the absence of an explicit connection drawn between social structure and culture, the critique of mass culture would have remained within the province of cultural criticism and of only incidental interest to the sociologist. Tocqueville's primary legacy with respect to the sociological debate over mass society and mass culture is, then, the idea that the former causes the latter.

Having noted Tocqueville's contribution to the contemporary critique of mass society and culture, an important qualification must be added. Although his argument anticipates several contemporary criticisms, it remains, after all, an analysis of the relationship between culture and social structure in a predominantly rural and still preindustrial society. A potential source of theoretical ambiguity in current discussions of mass society and culture arises when insufficient attention is given to the historical specificity of Tocqueville's analysis and critique. Specifically, the presumed cultural consequences of democratization can be,and often are, confused with those of industrialization. Tocqueville's discussion, in which the term "mass" never appears, is confined to an examination of the former, a critical specification rarely noted in the literature cataloguing the debate over mass society and mass culture. The notion that a highly fluid and democratic social structure produces cultural standardization and mediocrity finds its most extreme expression in the criticism of Jose Ortega Y Gasset. Like Tocqueville, Ortega contrasted the quality of culture in aristocratic and democratic societies. Unlike his predecessor, however, he directly linked the emergence of mass culture with industrialization and urbanization. Thus he explicitly employed the term "mass" to refer to the transformation of the European peasantry into the urban working classes of the early twentieth century. He characterized the attendant increases in the social and political power of European workers as the "rebellion of the masses," observing that the rapid urbanization of peasants after the First World War had reduced both their invisibility and passivity. The masses, who had existed "scattered about the world in small groups . . . to all appearances divergent, dissociate, apart," could now be seen everywhere - in the towns, hotels, parks, theaters, cafes (Ortega, 1957:42). Moreover, he noted a developing homogeneity of values, beliefs, and lifestyles among the masses, what later analysts would term "other directedness" or a "strain toward conformity," that was the beginning to have alarming political consequences. Hence Ortega was less concerned with longer lines at the theater than with a larger principle which he, reminiscent of Tocqueville, termed "hyperdemocracy." The mass was advancing on the arenas of political power and social exclusiveness, domains traditionally reserved for the elite. In the process, it:

> crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, qualified and select. Any-

> body who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated (Ortega, 1957:45).

Ortega's discussion opens the modern period in the criticsm of mass society and culture. With Ortega the concept of the mass assumes its now familiar reference to the cultural and political outcomes of the transformation of a rural peasantry into an urban proletariat, of a folk society into an industrial society. Indeed, despite differences in emphasis and perspective between Ortega and later critics, most of the major themes of the contemporary critique are present in his discussion and few have been significantly altered in the fifty years since he wrote The Revolt of the Masses.

In its contemporary form, the mass-culture critique encompasses four major arguments.[2] The critique alleges (1) the negative character of mass-culture creation, (2) negative effects of mass culture on high culture, (3) negative effects of mass culture on its audience, and (4) negative effects of mass culture on the society (Gans, 1966:552). The first two charges are based on a distinction between the nature of the creative process and of the relationship between creators and audiences in mass and high culture. Mass culture is viewed as a profit-oriented industry which directs a standarized product at a common denominator of tastes in a mass audience. In the process, mass culture transforms its creators into functionaries on cultural assembly lines, depriving them of creative autonomy. By contrast, high culture is "portrayed as noncommercial, producing a heterogeneous and nonstandardized product, and encouraging a creative process whereby an individual creator works to achieve his personal ends more than those of an audience" (Gans, 1966:554). However, mass culture impairs the quality of high culture by borrowing and debasing its content and luring away potential high-culture creators and users (Gans, 1966:552).

The specious and standarized content of mass culture and the diminished aesthetic freedom of creators and consumers derive, according to Leo Lowenthal, from a generalized "decline of the individual in the mechanized working processes of modern civilization" (Lowenthal, 1957:55). Indeed the technological revolution accompanying industrialization is viewed by many critics as the major impetus for the emergence and growth of mass culture, as well as its defining characteristic (see, e.g., Hyman 1969:377; van den Haag, 1957; 1960320-22). Rosenberg (1957:12) puts the issue sharply: "If one can hazard a single positive formulation (in the form of a hypothesis) it would be that modern technology is the necessary and sufficient cause of mass culture." It is also the cause of the demise of high culture, for a sophisticated and complex technology is apparently inimical to art, or rather, "genuine" art.[3]

Mass culture is assumed to destroy art in at least two ways. First, and most directly, art is denatured through serialization, condensation, outright recompositon, and other formulae dreamed up by mass-culture entrepreneurs to make the original

comprehensible and palatable to mass audiences (Arendt, 1960:283-84; van den Haag, 1960:322). Genuine art, which taxes the intellectual and emotional powers of the user through the creative blend of form and content, is transformed into kitsch or pseudo art which, at best, comforts and, at worst, brutalizes the senses of the consumer.

Second, several critics invoke a guilt-by-association logic to argue that, even if the original is allowed to remain intact, art is imperiled by the mere association with pseudo or non-art. Dwight Macdonald has suggested that presenting Renoir reprints alongside brassiere and television set advertisements in the pages of Life serves to destroy the value of the former, and, in fact, to destroy all values "since value judgements imply discrimination (Macdonald, 1957:62). Similarly, Rosenberg (1957:5), observing that Shakespeare and Mickey Spillane can be found in the same bookstores, asks: "Who can sort one from the other when they are built into a single slushy compost?" The inevitable result of the commingling of art and kitsch in the mass media and marketplace, according to Macdonald, is competition, and the advantage lies with kitsch. He goes so far as to propose that a variant of Gresham's Law operates in cultural "circulation:" ". . . bad stuff drives out the good, since it is more easily understood and enjoyed" (Macdonald, 1957:61).

Hence, in so far as art and kitsch must compete for consumers equipped to want and understand only the latter, the demand for art (as well as "good" or "genuine" or "serious" artists) evaporates. The temptation for creators to abandon high culture for the greater and more immediate rewards of creating for a mass audience, and thereby relinquish the expression of their individual values and skills to meet the average of tastes, grows accordingly (van den Haag, 1957:520-22).

Radical and Conservative Components of the Critique

If the critics are united in their disdain for the products of mass culture, they divide along political lines, or at least appear to,[5] on the question of responsibility. Two polar positions are discernible: a "radical" position traceable to Marx and Lukacs[6] and a conservative view rooted in the social and ccultural criticism of Tocqueville and Gasset. The radical view is succintly stated by Macdonald:

> Mass culture is imposed from above. It is fabricated by technicians hired by businessmen; its audience are passive consumers, their participation limited to the choice between buying and not buying. The Lords of kitsch, in short, exploit the cultural needs of the masses in order to make a profit and/or to maintain their class rule . . . (Macdonald, 1957:60).

For the conservative, the problem with mass culture is not that it is imposed on the masses but precisely that it delivers what its vast audience desires: distraction, vulgarity and sentimentality, In short, the problem with mass culture is that the masses con-

trol it. According to the conservative social philosopher Ernest van den Haag, the historical struggle between an aristocratic cultural and political elite and the masses has ended, under capitalism, in favor of the latter: "Initiative, and the power to bestow prestige and income, have shifted from the elite to the mass" (van den Haag, 1960:321).

While the conservatives emphasize the democratic leveling of cultural standards and distinctins which have accompanied the enormous growth of mass culture under capitalism, radical critics point to the transformation under capitalism of cultural objects into commodities and the consequent manipulation of consumer preferences by the owners and managers of mass-culture industries. Rejecting the notion of consumer control, the radicals argue that control over the production of culture has not been captured by the masses but, rather, by new technocratic and managerial elites who offer the masses a severely limited diet of easily digested cultural pablum. Consumers have little choice but to accept mass culture since the traditional autonomous folk cultures rooted in ethnic, regional, and even class identities are presumed to have disappeared or to have been co-opted by mass culture industries (see, e.g., Patterson, 1974).

In the process of co-optation, the oppositional or "two-dimensional" character of preindustrial cultures, including the high culture of older aristocratic elites, is eliminated. The destruction of what Marcuse terms the "alien" and "transcendant" elements of culture is accomplished not through explicit rejection "but through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, through their reproduction and display on a massive scale." The end result is the collapse of the historical tension between culture and social reality; culture, according to Marcuse, now serves only as an instrument of "social cohesion" (Marcuse, 1964:57).

In summary, the first two themes of the mass-culture critique are based upon several assumptions concerning the product, creators, and audience of mass culture. Unlike high culture, mass culture is assumed to create a standarized and homogeneous product, thereby severely delimiting the aesthetic freedom of its creators and users. A radical and conservative position are distinguishable with respect to the locus of control of mass culture. Radical critics assume that the tastes and desires of consumers are exploited by managerial elites who provide a limited cultural fare that ultimately affirms the political status quo. The conservatives, by contrast, argue that consumers are in control of mass culture and are provided with the trivial, sentimental, and vulgar product they desire. Finally, nearly all critics assume that mass culture impairs the quality of high culture by borrowing and debasing its product and by undermining the demand for serious art and artists.

The second two themes of the critique emphasize the harmful effects of mass culture

on its audience and on the larger social structure. Mass culture is said to be emotionally harmful to its audience because it provides spurious gratification of cultural needs. Its disproportionate emphasis on violence and sex is said to brutalize consumers. Further, it is viewed as intellectually destructive "because it offers meretricious and escapist content which inhibits ability to cope with reality . . ." (Gans, 1966:560). To the degree mass culture "narcotizes" and "atomizes" people, it makes them susceptible to techniques of mass persuasion wielded by demagogues and thus can lead to totalitarianism (Gans, 1966:567-79).

These charges, like the first two, rest upon several empirical assumptions. In this case, they concern the nature and quality of social relationships in advanced industrial society. Thus van den Haag (1960:321-22) observes that "excessive communication" functions to isolate people from one another, from themselves, and from "experience." By weakening interpersonal bonds, it makes people "indiscriminately tolerant" and indifferent. As a compensation for social isolation, popular approval becomes the most important standard by which attitudes and behavior are judged. Indeed, in the view of many critics, popularity is the aesthetic of mass culture.

Van den Haag's discussion highlights what is perhaps the most widely-held belief amongst the critics as to the character of the mass culture audience: its members think and feel alike. If consumers are confronted with a standardized and homogeneous product, they themselves exhibit a marked degree of cultural standardization - a widespread uniformity of tastes, beliefs, and values that cuts across traditional lines of differentiation such as age, religion, region, ethnicity, etc. (see Wilensky, 1964:178). Macdonald likens the structure of the mass-culture audience to that of the crowd, suggesting that it is so "undifferentiated and loosely structured that its atoms, in so far as human values go, tend to cohere only along the line of the least common denominator" (Macdonald, 1957:70). Even Herbert Gans, an observer otherwise skeptical of the massification thesis, has commented that "ethnic, religious, regional, and place differences are disappearing rapidly in American society . . ." (Gans, 1974:70).

The tendency toward cultural standardization in modern industrisl societies is explained on the basis of the mass-society assumption - i.e., the historical decline in importance of primary groups and relationships and the concomitant growth of gigantic, impersonal secondary associations such as the mass educational system, communications media, and the state. The progressive weakening of the normative controls of the family, peer group, and voluntary organizations has, according to the critics, not only resulted in cultural uniformity but has also left the individual virtually defenseless in the face of propoganda campaigns by extremist political movements (Kornhauser, 1959) and the state (Marcuse, 1964; Mills, 1959: ch.13). The critics fear that demagogues, trained in the sophisticated mass-persuasion techniques employed by media advertisers, could convince a

population (whose political values and beliefs are highly fluid in any case) to accept dictatorship. The argument is supported by citing the effectiveness with which Hitler and Stalin used the mass media to capture and maintain totalitarian control (Gans, 1974: 45-46).

To summarize, the second two themes of the critique postulate that mass culture is emotionally and intellectually harmful to its audience and promotes extremist and/or totalitarian tendencies in the society. The charges are anchored in a model of mass society which emphasizes weakened primary groups and ties and the dominance of large, increasingly centralized secondary structures, most notably the mass media. The diminution of the traditional normative controls of primary groups, coupled with the progressive transfer of socialization and social control functions to secondary organizations, have produced a pervasive cultural standardization that cuts across traditional bases of differentiation. (Standardization of the values, beliefs, and tastes of individuals is apparently viewed as reciprocally related with the standardization and homogenization of mass-culture content.) Additionally, the atomization of individuals in the mass society renders them defenseless before extremist and totalitarian campaigns.

Conceptual Ambiguity in the Critique of Mass Culture

Ideally, a description of the mass-culture critique and an explication of the assumptions about mass society upon which it rests would be followed by empirical examination. Unfortunately, however, the critique has been so loosely formulated, its core concepts so vaguely defined, that testing it must await its reformulation in a set of propositions which are, in fact, testable.

The empirical ambiguity of the critique stems in large part from imprecision in the formulation of central concepts and relationships. A good example is the peculiarly loose and haphazard manner in which the concepts mass, mass society, and mass culture are handled by the critics. Few define them in a way which clarifies causal relationships (a notable exception being Wilensky, 1964), many use them interchangeably, and some apparently see no need for defining them at all. Thus Hyman begins his discussion (1960:377) with the rather bold presumption that "we all know what mass culture is . . ." Equally deficient are definitions which liken the mass to a crowd or herd. As with most definitions-by-analogy, such formulations tend to emphasize the similarities between phenomena (e.g., suggestibility) while neglecting significant differences (e.g., proximity).

Moreover, use of the concept mass without adequate definition begs the major empirical questions raised by the critique. After all, claims such as mass culture is mass produced and that modern populations are culturally homogenous, atomized and susceptible to propoganda are hypotheses awaiting empirical confirmation. Yet these are the very kinds of

common-sense characterizations the concept evokes when it is not, or not otherwise, defined. Hence the argument that mass culture through its enforcement arm, the mass media, atomizes its audience borders on tautology, for an audience comprised of atomized individuals is presumably one of the preconditions for the enormous influence the media are alleged to exert. Of course the circularity inherent in such arguments is aggravated by the absence of accompanying evidence.

It should be stressed that the objection here is not to theories that postulate complex interdependencies but, indeed, to the absence of careful theorizing. Consider, as but one example, the following discussion of the emergence of "universal mass culture:"

> As Toynbee's Great West Wind blows all over the world, which quickly gets urbanized and industrialized, as the birth rate declines and the population soars, a certain sameness develops everywhere . . . African aborigines . . . leap out of their primitive past - straight into the movie house where, it is feared, they may be mesmerized like the rest of us. First besieged with commodities, postmodern man himself becomes an interchangeable part in the whole cultural process . . . In our time, the basis for an international sodality of man at his lowest level . . . appears to have been formed (Rosenberg, 1957:4).

While the empirical status of this statement is certainly open to question, at issue here is its theoretical adequacy. At a minimum, good theory should serve to isolate and clarify interrelationships; it should indicate both why and how events, processes, or actions are related. The present example does neither. Why do declining birthrates or industrialization promote cultural uniformity? Which has the greater impact? (Indeed, what do "declining" birthrates have to do with soaring populations?) How does urbanization influence cultural change? Again, whether these processes actually do foster cultural uniformity, whether the media do "mesmerize" to the degree implied, etc. are empirical questions whose answers are not (at least not yet) of concern. The objection is rather to the careless manner in which the questions themselves have been formulated and, more generally, to a kind of theorizing that sacrifices coherence and clarity for rhetorical display.

Examples of the imprecise conceptualization, tortuous logic, and tautological theorizing which characterize the mass-culture critique could be listed almost ad infinitum. However, rather than merely catalogue the critique's conceptual and logical gaffes, it would seem of greater importance to briefly address their causes. These certainly include, as Gans has suggested, a disdain for ordinary people and their aesthetic desires and capacities, as well as a creator as opposed to a user orientation to culture on the part of the critics (Gans, 1974:55-64). Most instructive, however, is to view the critique as a political doctrine, as a defensive ideology fashioned by downwardly mobile groups of intellectuals who "exaggerate their own loss of influence into a theory of overall social deterioration" (Gans,

1974:55-56). For if the reactionary (in the literal sense of the word) protection of high culture and of the power and privileges of its creators and interpreters is viewed as the ultimate objective of the mass-culture critique - i.e., if the critique is seen as an ideology of high culture rather than as a theory of mass culture - a less than scrupulous concern with clarity, logic, and empirical adequacy on the part of its advocates becomes understandable. Indeed, certain excesses would be expected.

By itself, the idea that social theories contain ideological elements is no longer especially novel or insightful. Moreover, the proponents of the critique presumably would have it perceived and evaluated according to "scientific" criteria. The relevant question then becomes not whether the critique is "really" ideology, but the impact of its ideological content on the selection of orienting assumptions, particularly those regarding the nature of human nature and of social organization. Specifically, does the ideology constructed to defend high culture presuppose a conception of human nature as essentially weak and passive or active and initiating? Does it entail an a priori conception of the organization of mass culture as homogeneous and monolithic or heterogeneous and pluralistic? After establishing the linkages between ideology and particular metatheoretical assumptions, a systematic examination of the ideological basis of the critique would then involve an analysis of the consequences of those assumptions for its internal and external validity.

This type of analysis can be illustrated with respect to two assumptions particularly relevant to the critique's ideological foundations, internal validity, and empirical consequences: the Pavolvian fallacy and the mass-market fallacy. The first refers to what Mendelsohn (1974) terms a "mechanico-deterministic" conception of human nature. The image of Homo Mechanicus as an essentially passive, malleable responder to external stimuli is a central, albeit implicit, assumption underlying the mass-culture critique, specifically criticisms of the content and functions of the mass media. Thus accompanying the image of Homo Mechanicus is a conception of the media as correspondingly powerful (Bauer and Bauer, 1960:6-9). The two assumptions, abetted by a drastically simplified behaviorist model of communication, result in a theory of the process of mass communication that posits "almost a one-to-one relationship between the content of the media and their impact on the public" (Bauer and Bauer, 1960:7). Media content is viewed as a deterministic stimulus eliciting immediate response from audiences. Moreover, since effects are viewed as mediated only by exposure, and not by the values, beliefs, and interpersonal relations of audience members, the more frequent the exposure to the media, the more intense the effect (Mendelsohn, 1974:381).

The Pavlovian fallacy has had significant methodological as well as theoretical consequences, among them the pervasive and uncritical use of content analysis to study mass culture. Its function for the ideology of high culture has been to legitimate the critic's alarm over the impact of mass culture. The efficacy of the ideology is dependent upon

demonstrating that mass culture is harmful to its audience and the larger society, not simply aesthetically disagreeable to certain intellectuals. This requires that the effect of mass culture be equated with its content which, in turn, requires a theory of mass culture based upon a conception of the media as powerful and of their audiences as passive responders.

A comment on the testability of value-laden theories is in order. If ideologies cannot be directly proven or disproven, neither must they be relegated to the realm of metaphysics, for they nearly always entail some theory of human nature and social organization comprised of certain assumptions which are testable. Indeed, if they did not, their very abstractness would limit their political utility. Accordingly, the analyst's task is to reconstruct the set of (often tacit) assumptions linking ideology to theory, where possible recast them into testable form, and select those for empirical examination whose disconfirmation would most severely undermine the theory. In the present case, the pivotal assumption is the equation of the content and effects of mass culture.

While the Pavolvian fallacy bears on the empirical adequacy of the mass-culture critique, the mass-market fallacy highlights the consequences of the ideology of high culture for the critique's internal validity. Thus perhaps the most ambiguous aspect of the critique is its assessment of the issue of control. As previously noted, the critics divide into conservative and radical camps on the issue, with the former arguing that effective control is vested in consumers and the latter locating control in managerial elites. However, a careful reading of the arguments of the leading proponents of each position - Ernest van den Haag and Dwight Macdonald - reveals both to contain inconsistencies largely resulting from a faulty conception of the nature and functions of mass markets.

Van den Haag (1957:519) offers a seemingly unambiguous statement of the conservative position: "The great mass of consumers now determines what is to be produced (by mass culture)." Yet his discussion also suggests that consumers do not control mass culture in any simple or direct manner. In fact, the mass market, as reflected for example in the statistical cross-sections of consumer preferences provided by ratings services, actually determines the content of mass culture. Consequently, only the "average consumer" is taken into account by the mass producers of culture and he or she exists only as a statistical abstraction fashioned by the market analyst. The individual choices and tastes of most consumers are at best only partially reflected in the statistical composite, while minority tastes are wholly ignored. The result is a "vaguely" felt sense of consumer dissatisfaction and restlessness (van den Haag, 1957:511-14, 519-20).

The mass market, in effect, defines mass culture through the refraction of a potentially unlimited range of consumer preferences into a homogeneous product. As such, it would appear to limit direct consumer control and to increase the influence of the advertisers, publicists, andother specialists who have the job of producing a "wide sharing" of taste, if not of directly molding or debasing it (van den Haag,1957:511). Implicit in van den Haag's

discussion, then, is a conflict between his hypothesis of consumer control and conception of the mass market.

Of course the irreconcilability of the mass-market model with consumer control is not a problem for radical critics. They begin their analysis with the assumption that mass culture is controlled by an elite that exploits the cultural desires and needs of consumers instead of satisfying them (Macdonald, 1957:60). The difference between exploiting and satisfying the users of mass culture evidently hinges upon a distinction between the classical liberal conception of the people and the modern idea of the masses:

> A folk or a people . . . is a community, i.e., a group of individuals linked to each other by common interests, work, traditions, values, and sentiments; something like a family, each of whose members has a special place and functions as an individual while at the same time sharing the group's interests, . . . sentiments . . . and culture (Macdonald, 1957:69-70).

By contrast

> the masses are in historical time what a crowd is in space: a large quantity of people unable to express themselves as human beings because they are related to one another neither as individuals nor as members of communities . . . The mass man is a solitary atom, uniform with and undifferentiated from thousands and millions of other atoms . . . (Macdonald, 1957: 69; for a similar distinction, see Mills, 1959:ch. 13).

Folk culture, because it was rooted in small, cohesive communities, satisfied the needs of its users.[7] On the other hand, mass culture, through the market mechanism, exploits the cultural needs of its users, i.e., responds merely to a common denominator of tastes and desires. Exploitation thus appears to refer to the refraction and consequent distortion of taste to service the mass market. However, Macdonald also uses the concept in another, quite different, sense. Paradoxically, the "lords" of mass culture exploit the masses not only by denying them what they want, or by giving them what they do not want, but by giving them what they do want as well - that is, by satisfying them. Along with their scientific brethren, the "questionnaire sociologists," they flatter the mass by "pander(ing) to its level of taste and ideas by taking these as the criterion of reality . . . or of art." In Macdonald's view, the mass marketers and the sociologists will "accept any idiocy if it is held by many people" (Macdonald, 1957:70). In short, if mass culture is imposed on the masses by elites, it is also "very, very democratic (Macdonald, 1957:62).

It is important not to overestimate the sophistication of this argument. Macdonald does not present an overarching theory that might reconcile these conflicting claims. Conceivably, he has in mind an idea such as Marcuse's (1964) highly complex (if empirically suspect) distinction between "true" and "false" needs, the former exploited by mass culture in favor of the gratification of the latter. If so, he fails to make this assumption explicit. As it stands, his discussion simply shifts back and forth from one position to the

other, with no evident awareness of contradiction, much less any attempt at creative synthesis.

In brief, both van den Haag's and Macdonald's discussions of the control of mass culture contain inconsistencies. Van den Haag posits a model of the mass market that conflicts with his contention that consumers get what they want from mass culture. Macdonald objects to the exploitation of consumers by an elite of technicians and managers but also objects to "pandering" to popular taste. Neither provides a coherent analysis of the relationship between the producers and consumers of mass culture, nor do their discussions, incomplete in themselves, somehow "add up" to a finished and consistent argument. For, ultimately, both discussions contain the same analytical defect: a model of the structure and process of the mass market which presupposes a static and monolithic relationship between the consumers and producers of mass culture. Van den Haag and Macdonald view the operation of the mass market as essentially invariant with respect to differences amongst consumers (e.g., working versus middle class), products (e.g., automobiles versus popular music), and differences in production organization (e.g., bureaucratic versus craft). Rather than ask under what conditions markets linking consumers and producers become more-or-less massified, and thereby proceed beyond the highly idealized folk culture-mass culture distinction, they simply define the markets serving mass culture as mass markets and then invoke this definition in explanations of the relative influence of consumers and producers.

The image of a unitary market binding all consumers and producers into impersonalized and coercive relationships, irrespective of product, medium, or production organization, prevents the reconciliation of the conflicting assertions embedded in each discussion. In van den Haag's case, consumers either control mass culture, or they do not; conceptualizing the mass market as a constant produces this polarization, leaving little ground for arguing an intermediate position. Likewise, Macdonald's rigid adherence to the mass-market assumption blinds him to the conditions under which consumer-producer relationships are nonexploitative, ending finally in the absurd contention that these relationships exploit consumers, even when they plainly do not.

The mass-market fallacy not only destroys the internal validity of the two arguments but their external validity as well. Although, as will be shown below, there is evidence to support rigorously specified propositions derived from each, neither viewed as a nascent "theory" of the distribution of control over mass culture, is consistent with available research data. Rather, the evidence suggests that the distribution of control is dependent on other variables, themselves complexly interrelated. Hence, if under certain conditions consumers do dictate cultural content, under other conditions the reverse holds true, while under still others mass-culture content is the variegated outcome of aesthetic conflict amongst consumers, creators, distributors and owners. To specify the attendant conditions is to abandon the fallacy of a unitary mass market and, finally, the conception of a single,

homogeneous mass culture.

The ideological resonance of the mass-market fallacy may be briefly summarized. The defense of high culture is based upon the assumption that its quality - for some critics, its very existence - is threatened by mass culture. The danger, say the critics, stems less from the lack of high-culture content in the mass media or from the abysmal level of mass taste, than from the mass market, which drains off talent that otherwise might have been devoted to the maintenance of high culture. A creature of industrialization, mass culture could not exist without the mass market. According to van den Haag, the cost economies made possible by mass production are realized only if a product appeals to large numbers of people. However, if mass-produced culture necessitates the refraction of individual preferences, including those of creators, into a few barely distinguishable selections, it also promises greater and more immediate rewards for creators than does "custom made" culture. The temptation to sell out to the mass market is virtually irresistable (van den Haag, 1957: 508-10, 520-22).

Neither van den Haag nor other critics of mass culture provide evidence to support the contention that mass culture impairs high culture. The ideology of defense relies solely upon several assumptions concerning the organization of production in the two cultures, the relative attractiveness of each to creators, and the structure of mass markets. These, along with other central assumptions underlying the critique,are examined in the following section.

Testing the Mass-Culture Critique: A Propositional Inventory

Using Gans' analysis as a guide, it is possible to derive three subgroups of empirical assumptions from the mass-culture critique.

A. The structural distinction between mass culture and high culture

1. Mass culture is comprised of industries whose purpose is to make a profit. High culture is not commercially oriented.

2. Mass culture is bureaucratically organized and thereby forces its creators to relinquish the expression of their personal values and skills. High culture, organized along craft lines, maximizes the aesthetic autonomy of creators.

3. Mass-culture consumers and producers are linked by a single mass market which directs standardized and homogeneous content to a common denominator of consumer tastes and preferences. High-culture content is nonstandardized and heterogeneous.

4. Mass culture was made possible by revolutions in production and communication technologies; the more advanced the technology, the more standardized the content of mass culture.

B. The impact of mass culture on high culture

1. Mass culture impairs the quality of high culture by borrowing and transforming its

content.

2. Mass culture endangers high culture by luring away its audience and creators.

C. The impact of mass culture on audiences and the larger social structure

1. The socialization and social-control functions of advanced industrial societies have shifted from primary groups to large, impersonalized, and centralized secondary structures, including the mass media.

2. The significance of primary groups and attachments has declined, freeing individuals of traditional normative controls.

3. The mass media have direct and largely deleterious effects on audiences.

4. Modern populations are increasingly susceptible to extremist propoganda campaigns.

5. A widespread uniformity of tastes, beliefs, and values, cutting across traditional lines of differentiation, characterizes the populations of advanced industrial societies.

Commercialism, Bureaucracy, and Artistic Freedom

The proposition that mass culture is distinctive because it is comprised of profit-making organizations is unfounded, at least in so far as it applies to the United States. Most of high culture in this country is produced and distributed by profit-seeking firms, if only due to the relative absence of state subsidy and patrons. Further, Herbert Gans has suggested, albeit with little direct evidence, that the profit motive may exert more intense pressures on high-culture entrepreneurs than on mass-culture firms to cut corners with competitors and deceive the consumer "if only because there are fewer customers and a less profitable and more unpredictable market, making it necessary to struggle harder to get business" (Gans, 1966:554). Undoubtedly the greatest difference between mass culture and high culture, with the exception of content, is audience size, and it is this difference that primarily accounts for existing structural distinctions (see Gans, 1966:555ff., and Meyersohn, 1961, for extended discussions).

If little is known about the existence and consequences of the profit motive in mass and high culture, some research evidence is available to evaluate the assumption that mass-culture creators cannot express their personal values and skills in their work. The implicit invidious contrast with high culture, where the serious practitioner is depicted as freely and spontaneously creating according to his or her own set of standards and tastes, is overdrawn. Innovation and conscious experiment occur in both settings, with the difference that experiments which are rejected by audiences during the lifetime of the high-culture practitioner may become classics in a later era, while mass-culture experiments that are not immediately successful are less likely to outlive their creators (Gans, 1966:555-56). In general, differences in the motives, methods, and roles of high and mass-culture creators are not as great as the critics suggest. There is evidence from the film, television, and publishing industries that mass-culture creators want to be free from the control of audiences and media executives and want to express their personal values and tastes (Hirsch, 1972;

Gans, 1957; 1966:556). Likewise, the so-called serious artist wants to please some audience. Thus Bensman (1967:55-56) suggests that the "ultimate validator" of the status claims of classical musicians is an audience that consists partly of fellow musicians but primarily of laymen (see Brown, 1968:619, for other examples).

Like his or her counterpart working in mass-culture organizations, the high-culture creator must establish a compromise between personal intentions and the desires of an audience. Differences in the measure of autonomy granted the two groups of practitioners is due more to differences in audience size than the necessity to compromise per se. Also, while the high-culture creator can often accomplish such compromises within him or herself, in mass culture the compromise between creator and audience preferences "is institutionalized and taken out of the creator's hands, for his work is often changed by editors, directors, and producers before it is distributed" (Gans, 1966:556; 1957). Nonetheless, in both cultures the highly successful creator can insist upon substantial artistic freedom, i.e., can tip the balance of compromise in his or her direction. As an empirical matter, a Picasso and a Stevie Wonder enjoy essentially the same degree of creative autonomy.

Moreover, "bureaucratic" interference with the creative process in mass culture is apparently much less pronounced than either the critics or even such sympathetic observers as Gans assume. The following account by Coser typifies the conventional wisdom with respect to the organization of the creative process in mass-culture firms:

> The industries engaged in the production of mass culture share basic characteristics with other mass production industries. In both, the process of production involves a highly developed division of labour and the hierarchical coordination of many specialized activities. In these industries no worker, no matter how highly placed in the organizational structure, has individual control over a particular product. The product emerges from the coordinated efforts of the whole production team, and it is therefore difficult for an individual producer to specify clearly his particular contribution (quoted in Brown, 1968:615).

This view contrasts sharply with evidence compiled by Paul Hirsch and others that indicates that the production sectors of mass culture industries are organized along craft rather than bureaucratic lines.[8] Artists are typically "delegated the responsibility of producing marketable creations, with little or no interference from the front office beyond the setting of budgetary limits . . ." (Hirsch, 1972:644; see also Petterson and Berger, 1971). Thus Brown (1968:621-22) finds that the working conditions of fiction writers for popular audiences are those normally associated with the craft and cites evidence that they derive a high degree of personal satisfaction from their work.

Craft, as opposed to bureaucratic, administration in mass-culture industries is a function of a relatively cheap production technology and demand uncertainty caused by, among other things, frequent and unpredictable shifts in consumer tastes and preferences (Hirsch, 1972:645). Gillett's (1972) analysis of early rock 'n' roll sales confirms the importance of demand uncertainty in giving a competitive advantage to small, independent recording companies

over bureaucratically organized national firms. The "independents," characterized by a minimal functional specialization, produced 101 top ten records between 1955 and 1959, compared with only 46 by the "majors." Additionally, of the ten artists who most consistently had records in the top ten during the period, only two recorded for companies "overlaid with conventional corporation structures of administration and decision-making" (Gillett, 1972: 76-79).

In an earlier, more stable, environment with less heterogeneous and more predictable markets, the production sectors of mass-culture industries were organized more bureaucratically: lower level personnel were delegated less creative responsibility and the status of artists was more like that of the salaried employee than the free-lance professional (Hirsch, 1972:646). What, then, may have mislead the critics (in addition to their failure to actually examine the crative process in mass culture) was either a selective focus on this earlier period or on the distribution sector of mass-culture industries, which is organized along lines of the sort outlined by Coser (see Brown, 1968, Hirsch, 1972:646ff.). Whatever the case, there is little evidence that the status, function, or work situation of the mass-culture creator are similar to those of workers in mass-production industries.

Finally, if the creative process in mass culture does not fit the assembly-line stereotype advanced by the critics, neither do high-culture creators work in milieux completely free of bureaucratic controls or instrumental considerations. Roger Brown notes that the great opera and ballet companies (and the major symphony orchestras may be included) are large organizations with divisions of labor at least as advanced as that of a major Hollywood studio (Brown, 1968:615). He also reminds us that great art works have been produced under severe time and economic constraints and motivated by less than purely expressive yearnings. Shakespeare, after all, owned stock in the company that produced his plays; Baroque music was written on commission; Dickens produced some of his best works under deadlines for serial publication; Sir Walter Scott wrote his later novels to pay off enormous debts; etc. (Brown, 1968:619-20).

In fine, the contention that freedom from extra-artistic pressures has been a necessary precondition for the production of "great" work is historically inaccurate. The art historian Meyer Shapiro (1964) has observed that even during the Renaissance, often depicted as a period during which artistic freedom flourished, patrons routinely dictated not only the subject of the art work they commissioned, but various stylistic elements as well. Moreover, such restrictions usually met with little protest from artists. More generally, the differentiation of art from other institutional contexts (notably religion) and, with it, the radical idea that artists ought to exercise independent control over, much less an expressive orientation to, their work are little more than a century old and remain unfinished historical processes (see Gerth and Mills, 1946:341-43; Albrecht, 1968; Mueller, 1963, Etzkorn, 1973: 43ff.).

The portrait of the artist as freely and spontaneously expressing personal values and

skills is the ideological hero of high culture in its continuing struggle for institutional independence, just as the image of the opportunistic hack is the villain in its competition for audiences with mass culture. To suggest that these images are sociological fictions is not to minimize their political significance.

Mass Markets and Technological Change

Robert Merton's insider-outsider distinction is a useful starting place for an evaluation of the proposition that the content of mass culture is more standardized and homogeneous than that of high culture. Cultural content that appears all-of-a-piece to an outsider may appear highly differentiated to a participant. As Gans (1966:555) has observed, if all rock 'n' roll music sounds similar to the uninitiated, so does all baroque music; only insiders are sensitive to variations within the genre. The key difference may not be that high culture is more internally differentiated, but that variations in its content appear more pronounced because they have been institutionalized in the form of "schools of art" (Gans, 1966:555). While comparative evidence is scarce, scholars have begun examining variations in the content of the popular arts and preliminary results lend support to Gans' position. Thus Gillett (1972) has uncovered five distinct styles of early rock 'n' roll music which correspon to ethnic, class, and regional differences in the rock 'n' roll audience. Keil's (1966) analysis of contemporary blues yeilds similar findings.

Nor does the mass-market assumption receive empirical support. Researchers have repeatedly found a heterogeneity of preferences, rather than taste common denominators, in the audiences of the popular arts. Taste preferences have been shown to be strongly linked with suc background variables as race, age, region, education, occupation, and political orientation (Denisoff and Levine, 1972b; Schuessler, 1948; Robinson and Hirsch, 1969; Hirsch, 1971;DiMaggio et al., 1972; Fox and Williams, 1974). Moreover, the influence of advances in communications technologies on the formation and maintenance of mass markets and tastes is much more complex than assumed by the critics of mass culture. Thus, while commercial television (in the United States at any rate) is directed at a mass audience, its content based upon a few pat formulae, the magazine industry distributes its products to highly specialized audiences. Over eight thousand magazines are published in the United States. Significantly, mass circulation magazines such as Life and Look have been forced out of business, largely because of their declining ability to compete with television for a mass audience and the advertising revenues attracted to it.

The motion picture industry, a mass medium like television throughout its sixty-year existence, has undergone a similar transformation. Hollywood has been forced to create for specialized audiences, primarily because it lost its large, cross-sectional audience to television (Gans, 1966:555). The same observations applies to radio. With the advent of television, a competition ensued between the two media which threatened the existence of radio. Television stole its mass audience. To compensate for the loss, radio had to "seek

new and different markets which could complement those of television"(Hirsch, 1971.380). Consequently, rock 'n' roll programming emerged in the mid-1950s, as did "all news," "all country," "all soul" stations, each aimed at subcultural markets - aggregates of listeners whose preferences and tastes were previously neglected because their numbers could not sustain network programming (Hirsch, 1971:381; see also Peterson and Berger, 1972:293-94).

Radio had the same impact on the recording industry in the early 1920s that television would have on it, motion pictures, and magazines forty years later. Record sales began to decline as people found it more convenient to tune in music on the radio. Among the many responses of the recording industry to the challenge of radio, one of the more successful was the search for new, specialized markets. It was at this point that recording companies sent representatives to the rural South to record black blues and white folk music and the phenomenon of "race" and "hillbilly" records and markets began (Green, 1965:208; Jones, 1963:98-103; Hemphill, 1970:79-82).

Hence, if some media distribute a standardized product to a mass audience, others do not. Rosenberg's formulation, noted earlier, linking mass culture with "modern technology," is oversimplified and, because he views mass culture as standardized culture, misleading. Available evidence suggests that as a technologically advanced medium appears it takes over the function performed by an earlier medium, forcing it to redefine its content and audience. In the process of redefinition, new, more specialized markets are sought and products are created that appeal to relatively small subcultural audiences. In sum, technological change promotes the destandardization of some media content (and, conceivably, the refinement of existing taste differences), while standardized content is shifted from less to more technologically advanced media (see Hirsch, 1971:381-82).

The Threat to High Culture

Does mass culture borrow content from high culture? Have high-culture creators gone over to mass culture for money and recognition? The answer to both questions is, of course, yes. Mass culture does borrow from high culture, actual and potential high-culture creators have undoubtedly been lured into mass-culture operations. However, the alleged consequences of these processes are less clear. If mass culture borrows content from high culture, as, for example, the makers of West Side Story borrowed the premise of Romeo and Juliet, the reverse also occurs: jazz and folk music have been lifted by high-culture creators for decades. In both cases individual creators may believe their work has been unduly changed, although only high-culture creators refer to such revisions as debasement. Yet, despite the suffering of high-culture practitioners when they see their art transformed, where is the evidence for the charge made by Hannah Arendt (1960) and other critics that high culture itself is thereby impaired? The critic's fears of a general cultural deterioration might be justifiable if it were shown that a significant proportion of high-culture creators stopped working after mass culture took over their products, but, again, there is no evidence for this occurring

(Gans, 1966:558-60).

Nor is there support for the view that high culture is endangered because some of its creators have gone over to mass culture. Admittedly, the larger issue of the effects of mass culture on high culture is difficult to assess because it is not known how much high culture would have grown and improved in quality if it did not have to compete for audiences with mass culture. Nevertheless, high culture has grown enormously in the past several decades, precisely the period during which, according to the critics, it should have displayed a decline. The number of symphony orchestras in the United States increased ten-fold between 1920 and the middle 1950s. Attendance at classical music events doubled between 1949 and the early 1950s. In 1934, classical record sales amounted to $75,000; sales exceeded $75,000,000 in 1954 (Bauer and Bauer, 1960:45; White, 1957:16-21). Finally, a recent nationwide survey conducted by Louis Harris prompted him to write that Americans are "much more involved in the arts than anyone suspected" (New York Times, February 9, 1975). Harris found that forty-nine percent of the public attend some kind of art shows, museums, or historical houses and thirty-seven percent attend musical performances.

While it is not known whether the consumption of mass-culture fare has increased faster than the consumption of high-culture products, these data suggest that the traditional arts have prospered along with mass culture. Of course, quantitative data on consumption patterns, even if they showed rates of high-culture consumption equal to or greater than those of mass culture, would not provide answers to the critics' charge that many contemporary high-culture consumers have an "inadequate background" or poorly developed tastes. However, it is plausible to assume that "these persons, having been introduced to higher artistic experiences, will, in the course of time, acquire the 'richer background' that the critic . . . insists is necessary for 'full appreciation' of high culture " (Bauer and Bauer, 1960:46). Another hypothesis deserving of examination is that mass culture functions as an entryway to high culture for many people. West Side Story may have provoked an interest in and understanding of the original that otherwise would not have existed. Just as there is as yet little direct evidence for these hypotheses, neither is there reason to believe high culture is being (or will be) taken over by the masses and converted into kitsch.

Primary Groups, the Media, and Cultural Uniformity

Nearly every critic of mass culture has, at one point or another, invoked the spectre of mass society to bolster characterizations of modern populations as culturally homogeneous and and vulnerable before the propoganda campaign and the media in general. There is, at least with respect to its purely descriptive purpose, substantial face validity to the mass-society model. There has been a transfer of functions from primary institutions like the family to the educational system, the legal system, social welfare bureaucracies, even the mass media. These social units are in fact large, complex, hierarchical, often intimidating structural creations of highly industrialized, urbanized, and politically centralized societies. What

is less certain is whether the transfer of functions from primary to secondary institutions has significantly weakened primary attachments and distinctions. If so, the critics are correct in pointing to greater cultural uniformity and susceptibility to media appeals as probable outcomes. However, if it can be shown that modern populations are not atomized or unattached to the degree the critics suggest - that close, holistic interpersonal relations continue to function as the essential, if not the only, basis for the formation and maintenance of political and aesthetic norms and identities - the critics' views of the power of the media and diminution of cultural differences are thereby called into question.

The primary group has an intellectual as well as a social history. While the decline of the primary group in industrial settings was a dominant motif in the writing of Tonnies, Durkheim, and other European scholars at the beginning of the century, the rediscovery of primary relations motivated the work of a large group of American researchers during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Perhaps the single most important finding to emerge from the studies of helping patterns and intimacy networks in cities (Sussman, 1953; Smith et al., 1954; Greer, 1956), voluntary association memberships (Wright and Hyman, 1958), work groups (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), combat groups (Stouffer et al., 1949), and most relevant for present purposes, the mass communications process (Lazarsfeld et.al., 1949; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Klapper, 1960) was the persistence of primary affiliations even in the most hostile of settings. These studies not only failed to support the hypothesis that the significance of primary groups has diminished in urban-industrial contexts, but, indeed, demonstrated that urban stratification systems, the impact of the media on political choices, the willingness of soldiers to fight or of workers to work could not be explained without reference to the intervening role of close interpersonal relations.

Often the discovery of primary affiliations unraveled severe empirical anomalies, as in the well known case of illumination and worker productivity. In other instances, the existence of primary groups had been recognized but their theoretical relevance was overlooked until the latter stages of research. Thus Warner wrote that "the discovery of the clique and the determination of its great significance as a social and structural mechanism came rather late in our field investigation in Yankee City . . ." (quoted in Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:38). In still others, the theoretical pertinence of the primary group seems never to have been noticed. Thus, while the massive studies conducted by Coleman and Jencks found family background to have greater explanatory significance for academic performance than all school-related variables combined, neither placed this finding in a theoretical context that emphasized primary relations (or any other theoretical context, for that matter).

If primary groups retain significance in urban-industrial settings, what, then, of the idea of the mass? Although the mass-culture critics have not offered a systematic definition, terms like crowd, herd, and atoms suggest a conception of media audiences with at least four distinctive features: (1) the mass is heterogeneous in composition, its members representing all social groups. (2) Its members do not know one another. (3) Its members are spatially

separate and thus cannot interact. (4) The mass has no definite leadership structure and is loosely organized, if organized at all (Friedson, 1954:313-14). As Friedson notes, this conception of the mass is internally consistent and quite amenable to empirical investigation.

The notion that media audiences are heterogeneous, anonymous, noninteracting, leaderless aggregates is not supported by existing research evidence. As previously noted, several studies have shown that audiences are comprised of distinct taste cultures, to borrow a term from Gans, rooted in ethnic, regional, class, and political identities. Only commercial television, for reasons already discussed, appears to display audience characteristics resembling those of the mass and there is reason to believe recent technological innovations (e.g., cable and satellite broadcasting) may promote taste differentiation, particularly along regional lines, in that medium's audience as well (see Arlen, 1976)[9]. In addition, the selection of media content, and exposure and response to it, are pre-eminently social acts, i.e., they occur within the context of existing group affiliations and are regulated by extant group norms and traditions. Thus Riley and Riley (1951) found a significant association between children's responses to violent television content and integration into peer groups. Johnstone and Katz (1957) found a relationship between group membership and the selection of radio music programs among teenagers. Moreover, the "opinion leader" emerged in the work of Lazarsfeld and his colleagues as precisely the mechanism by which media content is relayed to and absorbed by local group cultures (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). These and other research findings suggest that the constituent element of media audiences is the social group, rather than the solitary individual. The group, in a sense, selects, organizes, and interprets media content for members according to pre-established group norms, interests, and leadership patterns. As such, the group is the mediator between the individual and mass communications.

Media effects must then be evaluated in the context of intervening group affiliations. Consequently, the proposition of a one-to-one correspondence between media content and effects must be rejected. Even the archetypal case of the effects of televised violence on children provides little support for the contention that the media have direct snd harmful effects on audiences. While recent studies have established that children spend upwards of twenty hours a week watching television and that interpersonal violence is a common element in many of the programs they watch (Murray, 1973:473-75), few have found a relationship between violent content and behavior. An early study conducted in England concluded that children are unlikel to "translate television experience into action" (Klapper, 1960:156). A recent study of the imitation of antisocial behavior viewed on television similarly found no effects among adolescents and adults (Milgram and Shotland, 1973). Although other investigations, primarily conducted in the laboratory, have found a relationship between television violence and "aggression" (variously defined), there is considerable controversey in the social-psychological literature as to whether the relationship is positive or negative. Thus a recent "controlled"

field study found that boys who watched violent television programs tested less aggressive on a variety of measures than boys who watched nonviolent programs (Feshbach, 1969; Feshbach and Singer, 1970). While a group of researchers has challenged these results (Eron et al., 1972), a review of the literature concludes that "the nature of the viewer, the nature of the stimulus, and the nature of the situation interact in such ways that exposure to mass media may either facilitate or inhibit the expression of aggression" (Wrightsman, 1972:146). In other words, there seems to be no simple or direct relationship between media content and effects, at least as evidenced by studies of television violence.

Similar results emerge from studies of the impact of political messages contained in popular songs. A survey of 430 Michigan high school students conducted in the late 1960s found that fewer than thirty percent could correctly identify the message of a number of songs popular at the time, many of which had been condemned by the press, the Vice President and others as "subversive" (Robinson and Hirsch, 1969). Another study, intentionally designed for maximum communication effectiveness, produced nearly identical findings (Denisoff and Levine, 1972a). A sample of sociology students at San Francisco State College was asked to interpret the message of "Eve of Destruction," a popular, explicitly political song with an unambiguous message. It's composer defined the meaning of the song as "the nuclear weapon being a 'cloud hanging over me all the time.'" The song further states that "if the world is full of hate, we have to change it . . ." (Denisoff and Levine, 1972a:216-217). Moreover, unlike the previous study, the researchers supplied respondents with the lyric. In addition, the researchers selected a sample they believed to be favorable to the song's message, in as much as sociology students are generally regarded as more politcally liberal than other students (Denisoff and Levine, 1972a:216).

Given this research design, the results are rather astonishing. Only eleven percent of the total sample fully understood the song's message, while fourteen percent of those who had previously heard the song understood it. Although thirty-six percent of the sample did partially understand the message, the striking finding produced by this study is that over one half of a sample of comparatively liberal college students could not correctly interpret the message of a controversial and manifestly political song, even when they had been furnished the lyric beforehand.

It can be argued that popular songs, even those with clear political messages, are not intended to raise the political consciousness of listeners or spur them to political action. However, media campaigns designed to, for example, promote favorable attitudes towards the United Nations or the prevention of inflation as a reason to buy war bonds have been conspicuous in their failure to change public attitudes and behaviors (Bauer and Bauer, 1960:11-12). Finally, despite the vast sums of money recent Presidential candidates have spent on media advertisements, their influence on voter choices has been repeatedly questioned by media researchers. Lazarsfeld's pioneering study of Erie County voters produced little evidence that people change their political stand as a result of the influence of the mass media (Lazar-

feld et al., 1948). Likewise, a careful investigation of the 1972 Presidential election showed that the media blitz conducted by both candidates had little or no influence on the outcome (Patterson and McClure, 1976). Nor did the study produce support for the assumption that modern populations are susceptible to manipulation by way of selective appeals, simplification, or other propaganda techniques. The investigators concluded that "the vast majority of Americans are immune to advertising propaganda. They are not manipulated" (Patterson and McClure, 1976:88, emphasis in original).

Clearly, there is scant support for the equation of media content and effects. While additional research is needed, particularly with respect to long-term effects, the history of research on the impact of the media on the attitudes and behaviors of audiences raises, not the spectre of individual vulnerability, but the question of group resistance. As Klapper (1960) has pointed out, exposure alone rarely guarantees an effect because audiences typically selectively attend to and selectively perceive material that conflicts with their existing attitudes and opinions; indeed, a major effect of the propaganda campaign appears to be the reinforcement of pre-existing opinions rather than conversion to new ones. These findings, together with the work on the persistence of primary groups and the role of interpersonal relations in the mass communications process, are relevant to a final assumption made by the critics of mass culture, viz., the trend toward cultural uniformity in the mass society.

The belief in the progressive cultural homogenization of industrialized and industrializing societies is so widespread it crops up in even the most unlikely of contexts. Thus a well-known astronomer observes that the opportunity to explore other worlds comes at a time when we "are in the midst of a great cultural and technological homogenization, in which common habits of thought and a shared world view are rapidly embracing even the most distant and obscure parts of our small planet" (Sagan, 1976:16). Most observers point to the homogenizing influences of the media, mass education and literacy, high rates of social and geographic mobility, increased travel, national markets, and a national politics to support the thesis of a widespread sharing of values, beliefs, and tastes in the United States (see, e.g., Wilensky, 1964:178). Implicit in this and similar formulations is the assumption that common stimuli (e.g., a nationwide mass media) elicit common responses, a notion that by now should be immediately suspect. Too, there is the theoretical problem of distinguishing trivial from nontrivial instances of convergence. Superficial similarities in dress and leisure-time pursuits, as well as the apparent erosion of regional and ethnic folk cultures, could mask the persistence of group differences, and the emergence of new ones, with respect to salient values, attitudes, and behaviors. There is then the problem of evidence. The convergence hypothesis, like the other empirical assumptions underlying the massification thesis, has not been accompanied by systematic research.

In fact, few empirical studies of the convergence hypothesis exist. However, the results of two investigations, employing different research designs, do not support the hypothesis of cultural convergence, at least with respect to the period between World War II and

and the middle 1960s. The data for a study of regional cultural differences (Glenn and Simmons, 1967) consisted of forty-four questions drawn from national opinion surveys conducted between 1950 and 1961. The items selected dealt with a wide range of values and beliefs related to "enduring" and "important" national issue areas (e.g., politics, religion, work, race relations). Respondents were grouped into dichotomous age categories (21-39, 40+ for Gallup surveys; 21-44, 45+ for NORC surveys) and regions were classified according to the four Census categories (NE, NC, S, W). The data were analyzed according to the following assumption: If regional cultural differences have diminshed, they should be greater among older people than among younger people. In fact, all interage comparisons of the percentages of "most liberal" responses for each pair of regions showed the reverse: Greater variation was found in the younger age category than in the older.

While such a finding is intriguing, there are serious limitations to its validity, most important among which is the absence of controls for maturation effects. In addition, the study leaves open the question of convergence on other dimensions (race, education, occupation, sex, etc.). Ideally, one would want to examine cultural differences on several dimensions by directly comparing responses to survey items given at one point in time with those given at another. Fortunately, Glenn did just that in a second study.

In this study, he selected thirteen questions "judged to be relatively stable measures of attitudes and behavior and that were repeated (with substantially the same meaning if not identical wording) . . . at intervals of at least eight years" in national surveys conducted between the late 1930s and 1964 (Glenn, 1967:174). For each question, the responses of rural and urban residents, whites and nonwhites, males and females, Southerners and non-Southerners, Protestants and Catholics, manual and nonmanual workers, and the highly and poorly educated (some college versus eighth grade or less) were compared at an early and later date, with an average of sixteen years between the dates. The Index of Dissimilarity (ID) was computed as a summary measure "of the differences between each pair of compared response distributions" (Glenn, 1969:175). Cohort analysis was rejected due to limitations of sample and subsample size.

The results failed to confirm the convergence hypothesis. The average ID (for the thirteen questions) was lower at the later than at the earlier dates only in the cases of sex and urban-rural differences and in neither case was the difference statistically significant. Differentiation was significantly greater at the later dates in the cases of education and religion and nonsignificantly greater in the remaining cases. For all comparisons taken together, differentiation was higher at the later dates (Glenn, 1967:175-76).

Glenn concluded with an important suggestion for future theoretical and empirical work: "Until more evidence is in, sociologists should stop accepting on faith unsubstantiated claims about the nature of 'mass society' and should give more theoretical attention to influences that tend to perpetuate and enlarge . . .(cultural) differences"(Glenn, 1967:179). Certainly one problem requiring greater attention is the relationship between mass communica-

tions and cultural change. Thus a fascinating hypothesis suggested by Glenn's work is that a common media "message" may function to increase rather than reduce cultural differentiation. Previous research has demonstrated (1) the media have differeng effects according to the pre-existing values, attitudes, and beliefs of audiences; and (2) the media often serve to reinforce pre-existing norms, but rarely lead to conversions. In the illustrative case of regional cultural differences, if the values promoted through the national media conflict with those deeply ingrained within a region, they are likely to be rejected or evaded there. However, if media values agree with the dominant values of a region, and if there is a strong tendency toward more general acceptance of those values, the media may accelerate the change. Hence, as Glenn has proposed, by "having different effects in different localities, mass communication may increase rather than decrease certain kinds of geographic cultural variation" (Glenn and Simmons, 1967:193). This hypothesis, of course, need not be limited to regional cultural differences but can be evaluated with respect to race, ethnic, age, sex, class, and religious differences as well. In any case, the persistence of group differences in the face of the structural changes wrought by industrialization should be high on the research agendae of social scientists whose curiosities have been stirred by the critique of mass culture.

The Future of the Debate over Mass Society and Culture

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the critique of mass society and culture will not be overthrown with research findings. If the research summarized in this paper is to have a lasting impact on the debate ovet the nature and quality of modern social and cultural institutions it must be connected with a social theory equal in imagination and scope with that of the critics. A detailed presentation of such a theory will not be attempted here.[10] Nonetheless, certain general comments are in order.

The terms mass culture and mass society should be dispensed with. They retain little utility and in fact are highly misleading before evidence of the continuing significance of primary groups and the multiplicity of taste cultures they support. Even the widely-used "popular culture," although less pejorative, is not entirely satisfactory because it covers such a broad and diverse spectrum of cultural content, creators, media, and users. Better to dispense with covering terms altogether and simply, following Gans yet again, decompose popular (and high) culture into their constituent taste cultures, according to content, and taste publics, according to audience characteristics. The number, size, interconnections, functions, and effects of these subcultures, as well as the degree to which they retain folk elements, are commercially oriented, and so on then become empirical questions.

Second, in so far as social theories carry with them implications for research methodologies, the heavy reliance on content analysis to inform the mass-culture critique - and to study the interrelations of the media, arts, and society in general - should be discontinued.

The key limitations of content analysis, as many analysts have pointed out (Mendelsohn, 1974; Peterson, 1971; Hirsch, 1971; Denzin, 1970; Denisoff and Levine, 1971; Bauer and Bauer, 1960), is that while it may yield much about cultural content, it logically cannot analyze cultural effects. However, content analyses of song lyrics (Cole, 1971; Carey, 1969a; 1969b; Reinharz, 1975; Hayakawa, 1955), children's books (Huggins and Straus, 1974), and advertising literature (Ewen, 1975) have lead their authors to suppose, for example, that popular song lyrics prohibit adolescent boys from developing "realistic" and "mature" views of adolescent girls and that children's literature socializes the young to behave violently.

What seems to have escaped these researchers is that content analysis, by itself, cannot support conclusions about the values, attitudes, and, particularly, the behaviors of audiences. Simply because cultural content appears to a researcher as violent or subsersive or sexist or whatever does not necessarily mean audiences share such interpretations or, even if they do, will convert them into attitudes and behaviors. Further, audiences may completely ignore that which researchers find important or intriguing in content and/or emphasize elements researchers do not see, hear, or feel. Thus Robinson and Hirsch (1969:43, 45) seemed somewhat surprised to find seventy percent of a sample of high school students liked records more for the "beat" than the message. This finding would likely not surprise most high school students and, moreover, the question itself would probably be viewed as rather silly.

Rather, the surprise that emerges from much of the content analysis literature is why a relatively small group of highly educated, predominantly white, predominantly middle-aged, and predominantly male social scientists would routinely assume that audiences of vastly different backgrounds and perspectives perceive and interpret cultural content as they do. While much could be made of the question from the vantage point of the sociology of knowledge, its methodological message is clear: To study the impact of cultural content on audiences (or vice versa) it is not sufficient to merely study content; audiences must be studied as well.

Of course audiences may be studied by way of a variety of techniques, each suited to particular research questions. It would make little sense to dogmatically suggest that audience studies be conducted only on the basis of survey methods, or only qualitative methods, or even that rigorously controlled laboratory experiment should not play a part. However, the theoretical relevance ofparticular methodologies should be continuously pondered by those who would build a new theory of society and culture. If that theory is to emphasize the function of primary groups as carriers and modifiers of culture, then research strategies must be selected which, in Norman Denzin's words, penetrate the realities of social groups. Indeed, perhaps the sociologist's singular contribution to future discussions of the interrelations of society and culture would be to bring the group back in.

Notes

1. For detailed discussions of the mass-society conception, see Kornhauser, 1959, and Mills, 1959:298ff.

2. The following categorization is taken from Gans, 1966:553-79. For similar listings, see Bell. 1962, and Bauer and Bauer, 1960:39ff..

3. Hence van den Haag, 1960:332, asserts that the mass media, because they "must conform to average cannons of taste . . . cannot foster art; indeed they replace it."

4. On the contrast between genuine art and mass culture, see Macdonald, 1957; Greenberg, 1957, Hyman, 1960:381; Lowenthal, 1957:49-52.

5. Ellen Willis has suggested that the radical and conservative views of mass culture are fundamentally the same, a position explored in some detail shortly. See A Redstocking Sister, 1971.

6. For a perceptive analysis of the cultural criticism of the "Frankfort" Marxists, see Jay, 1971.

7. "It was a spontaneous, autochthonous expression of the people. shaped by themselves . . . to suit their own needs" Macdonald, 1957:60.

8. See Stinchcombe, 1959, for an extended idscussion of the distinction between craft and bureaucratic administration of production.

9. A veteran television critic is convinced that the development of the video cassette machine promises fundamental changes in the content, distribution, and consumption of commercial television. See O'Connor, 1977.

10. See Hamilton, 1972:ch.12, for the outlines of a "group-based" theory of modern industrial society that draws upon much of the mass communications empirical literature cited above.

References

Albrecht, Milton C.
1968 Art as an institution. American Sociological Review 33:383-97.

Arendt, Hannah
1960 Society and culture. Daedalus 89:278-87.

Arlen, Michael
1976 Talking back. The New Yorker (November 22):184-94.

Bauer, Raymond A. and Alice H. Bauer
1960 America, mass society and mass media. Journal of Social Issues 16:3-66.

Bell, Daniel
1962 Modernity and mass society: on the varieties of cultural experience. Studies in Public Communication 1:3-34.

Bensman, Joseph
1967 Classical music and the status game. Trans-Action 4:55-59.

Brown, Roger L.
1968 The creative process in the popular arts. International Social Science Journal 20:613-24.

Carey, James T.
1969a Changing courtship patterns in the popular song. American Journal of Sociology 74:720-31.

1969b The ideology of autonomy in popular lyrics: a content analysis. Psychiatry 32:150-64.

Cole, Richard R.
1971 Top songs in the sixties: a content analysis of popular lyrics. American Behavioral Scientist 14 389-400.

Denisoff, R.Serge and Mark H. Levine
1971 The one dimensional approach to popular culture: a research note. Journal of Popular Culture 6:911-19.

1972a Brainwashing or background noise: the popular protest song. Pp. 312-21 in R. Serge Denisoff and Richard A. Peterson, eds. The Sounds of Social Change. Chicago: Rand McNally.

1972b Youth and popular music: a test of the taste culture hypothesis. Youth and Society 4:237-55.

Denzin, Norman K.
1970 Problems in analyzing elements of mass culture: notes on the popular song and other artistic productions. American Journal of Sociology 75:1035-38.

DiMaggio, Paul, Richard A. Peterson, and Jack Esco, Jr.
1972 Country music: ballad of the silent majority. Pp. 38-55 in R. Serge Denisoff and Richard A. Peterson, eds. The Sounds of Social Change. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Eron, Leonard L., L. Rowell Huessmann, Monroe M. Lefkowitz, and Leopold O. Walder
1972 Does television violence cause aggression? American Psychologist (April): 253-63.

Etzkorn, K. Peter
1973 Music and Society: The later writings of Paul Honigsheim. New York: Wiley.

Ewen, Stuart
1975 Advertising as a way of life. Liberation (January): 17-34.

Feshbach, S.
1969 Film violence and its effects on children: some comments on the implications of research for public policy. American Psychological Association address. Washington, D.C.

Feshbach, S. and R.D. Singer
1970 Television and Aggression San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Fox, William S. and James D. Williams
1974 Political orientation and music preferences among college students. Public Opinion Quarterly 38:352-71.

Freidson, Eliot
1953 Communications research and the concept of the mass. American Sociological Review 18:313-17.

Gans, Herbert J.
1957 The creator-audience relationship in the mass media: an analysis of movie making. Pp. 315-24 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

1966 Popular culture in america: social problem in a mass society or social asset in a pluralist society? Pp. 549-620 in Howard S. Becker, ed. Social Problems: A Modern Approach. New York: Wiley.

1974 Popular Culture and High Culture. New York: Basic Books.

Gerth, Hans and C. Wright Mills
1946 From Max Weber. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gillett, Charlie
1972 The Sound of the City. New York: Dell.

Glenn, Norval D.
1967 Massification versus differentiation: some trend data from national surveys. Social Forces 46:172-80.

Glenn, Norval D. and J.L. Simmons
1967 Are regional cultural differences diminishing? Public Opinion Quarterly 30: 176-95.

Green, Archie
1965 Hillbilly music: source and symbol. Journal of American Folklore 78:204-28.

Greenberg, Clement
1957 Avant-garde and kitsch. Pp. 98-107 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Greer, Scott
1956 Urbanism reconsidered: a comparative study of local areas in a metropolis. American Sociological Review 21:19-25.

Hamilton, Richard F.
1972 Class and Politics in the United States. New York: Wiley.

Hayakawa, S.I.
1955 Popular songs versus the facts of life. ETC 12:83-89.

Hemphill, Paul
1970 The Nashville Sound. New York: Pocket Books.

Hirsch, Paul M.
1971 Sociological approaches to the pop music phenomenon. American Behavioral Scientist 14:371-88.

1972 Processing fads and fashions: an organization-set analysis of cultural industry systems. American Journal of Sociology 77:639-59.

Huggings, Martha D. and Murray A. Strauss
1975 Violence and the social structure as reflected in children's books from 1850 to 1970. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society. New York, New York.

Hyman, Stanley Edgar
1960 Ideals, dangers, and limitations of mass culture. Daedalus 89:377-87.

Jay, Martin
1973 The Dialectical Imagination. Boston: Little, Brown.

Johnstone, John and Elihu Katz
1957 Youth and popular music: a study in the sociology of taste. American Journal of Sociology 62:563-68.

Jones, LeRoi
1963 Blues People. New York: William Morrow.

Katz, Elihu and Paul F. Lazarsfeld
1955 Personal Influence. New York: Free Press.

Keil, Charles
1966 Urban Blues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Klapper, Joseph T.
1960 The effects of mass communication. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Kornhauser, William
1959 The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet
1948 The People's Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lowenthal, Leo
1957 Historical perspectives of popular culture. Pp. 46-57 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Macdonald, Dwight
1957 A theory of mass culture. Pp. 59-73 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Marcuse, Herbert
1964 One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon.

Mendelsohn, Harold
1974 Behaviorism, functionalism and mass communications policy. Public Opinion Quarterly 38:379-89.

Meyersohn, Rolf
1961 A critical examination of commercial entertainment. Pp 243-72 in Robert W. Kleemeier, ed. Aging and Leisure. New York: Oxford University Press.

Milgram, Stanley and R. Lance Shotland
1973 Television and Anti-Social Behavior: Field Experiments. New York: Academic Press.

Mills, C. Wright.
1959 The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mueller, John H.
1963 A sociological approach to musical behavior. Ethnomusicology 7:216-20.

Murray, John P.
1973 Television and violence: implications of the surgeon general's research program. American Psychologist (June).

O'Connor, John J.
1977 TV on the eve of drastic change. New York Times (November 13).

Ortega Y Gasset, Jose
1957 The coming of the masses. Pp. 41-45 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Patterson, Timothy
1974 Popular culture and organic intellectuality. Insurgent Sociologist 5:67-72.

Patterson, Thomas E. and Robert D. McClure
1976 Political campaigns: tv power is a myth. Psychology Today (July):62-64, 88-90.

Peterson, Richard A.
1971 Taking popular music too seriously. Journal of Popular Culture 4:590-94.

Peterson, Richard A. and David G. Berger
1971 Entrepreneurship in organizations: evidence from the popular music industry. Administrative Science Quarterly 16:97-107.

1972 Three eras in the manufacture of popular music lyrics. Pp. 282-303 in R. Serge Denisoff and Richard A. Peterson, eds. The Sounds of Social Change. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Redstocking Sister
1971 Consumerism and women. Vivian Gornick and Barbara Moran, eds. Women in Sexist Society. New York: Basic Books.

Reinhartz, Kay F.
1975 The paper doll: images of american woman in popular culture. Pp. 293-308 in Jo Freeman, ed. Women: A Feminist Perspective. Palo Alto, California: Mayfield.

Riley, Matilda W. and John W. Riley, Jr.
1951 A sociological approach to communications research. Public Opinion Quarterly 15:445-60.

Robinson, John and Paul M. Hirsch
1969 It's the sound that does it. Psychology Today (October):42-45.

Roethlisberger, Fritz J. and William J. Dickson
1939 Management and the Worker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rosenberg, Bernard
1957 Mass Culture in America. Pp. 3-12 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Sagan, Carol
1976 Two ships in the cosmic ocean. Cornell Alumni News (November):16-18.

Schuessler, Karl
1948 Social background and musical taste. American Sociological Review 13:330-35.

Shapiro, Meyer
1964 On the relation of patron and artist: comments on a proposed model for the scientist. American Journal of Sociology 70:363-69.

Smith, J., W.H. Form, and G.P. Stone
1954 Local intimacy in a middle-sized city. American Journal of Sociology 60:276-84.

Stinchcombe, Arthur L.
1959 Bureaucratic and craft administration of production: a comparative study. Administrative Science Quarterly 4:168-87.

Stouffer, Samuel A. et al.
1949 The American Soldier: Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. Princeton University Press.

Sussman, Marvin B.
1953 The help pattern in the middle class family. American Sociological Review 18: 22-28.

Tocqueville, Alexis de
1960 On democracy and the arts. Daedalus 89:401-409.

Van den Haag, Ernest
1957 Of happiness and despair we have no measure. Pp. 504-36 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

1960 A dissent from the consensual society. Daedalus 89:315-24.

White, David Manning
1957 Mass culture in america: another point of view. Pp. 13-21 in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. Mass Culture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Wilensky, Harold L.
1964 Mass society and mass culture: interdependence or independence? American Sociological Review 29:173-97.

Wright, Charles R. and Herbert H. Hyman
1958 Voluntary association memberships of american adults: evidence from national sample surveys. American Sociological Review 23:284-94.

Wrightsman, Lawrence S.
1972 Social Psychology in the Seventies. Belmont, California: Wadsworth.